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There is now widespread recognition that in most countries, private-sector investment has 
not been able to absorb surplus labor. This is all the more the case for poor unskilled 
people. Public works programs and employment guarantee schemes in South Africa, 
India, and other countries provide jobs while creating public assets. In addition to 
physical infrastructure, an area that has immense potential to create much-needed jobs is 
that of social service delivery and social infrastructure. While unemployment and 
enforced “idleness” persist, existing time-use survey data reveal that people around the 
world—especially women and children—spend long hours performing unpaid work. This 
work includes not only household maintenance and care provisioning for family members 
and communities, but also time spent that helps fill public infrastructural gaps—for 
example, in the energy, health, and education sectors. This paper suggests that, by 
bringing together public job creation, on the one hand, and unpaid work, on the other, 
well-designed employment guarantee policies can promote job creation, gender equality, 
and pro-poor development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Structural adjustment and financial liberalization have resulted in uneven and, more often 
than not, disappointing patterns of socioeconomic development.  Put simply, the 
expectation that unfettered markets lead to higher growth rates, job creation, and hence, 
to decreased poverty and more equitable income distribution never came to pass. 
Investment did not always flow where most needed, as in the case of sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia. In those cases that it did, healthy growth rates did not necessarily lead to 
reduction of poverty and income inequality, as the experience of most Latin American 
countries can attest to. Perplexed governments, international development agencies, and 
the Bretton Woods institutions have arrived at the conclusion that “trickle down” effects 
do not take place in a timely fashion and it is generally acknowledged that fresh ideas are 
needed.  
In the search for new directions we must keep in mind that since poverty is the 
result of different processes, one size will not fit all. Some people find themselves in 
poverty because they are (or become) landless. Other people are caught in the grinds of 
meager wages and precarious, unregulated work conditions. Yet others lack the skills and 
education level to match them to better paying existing vacancies. Clearly, the policy 
recommendations in each of these cases would be quite different.  There also exists 
another group of people whose economic suffering is largely based on chronic and severe 
lack of employment opportunities stemming from the inability of the private sector to 
create a sufficient number of jobs to absorb surplus labor. Ready, willing, and able to 
work, this army of the unemployed simply cannot find a job.   
  Unemployment, underemployment, and forced “inactivity” confront many people 
in developing and developed countries alike. This issue has invited much research and 
commentary in the economics profession and a review of this literature is beyond the 
scope of this paper.
2 Whatever the reason may be, the requisite structural transformations 
and growth rates needed to absorb those forced into idleness are too high for most 
countries, and hence unattainable within a short- to a medium-term horizon. In such 
instances, the government acting as an employer of last resort (ELR), and thus 
implementing a public employment guarantee policy (EGP), can go a long way. The 
                                                 
2 For an excellent discussion of the issues, see Islam (2006).   3
focus on this paper is on this very issue.  ELR and EGP ought to be considered as an 
instrumental part of the policy mix that shields people against unemployment and 
inactivity. 
3  
 In addition to income generation, these programs have the potential to contribute 
in many ways to improved living conditions.  They can create infrastructural assets with 
the potential to crowd in new investment. When designed in ways that take into account 
the needs of those engaged in low productivity subsistence activities and agriculture, they 
can increase food security. In underserved areas they can result in environmental 
restoration, water conservation, and empowerment of local communities to design 
projects that increase the quality of life. As we will see shortly, they can also be effective 
in reducing the burdens of women and children who perform long hours of unpaid work 
and unpaid care work. Finally, as progress in achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) has been slow in some countries, public job creation ought to be given 
due consideration as a policy option toward that end.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section I discusses the importance and 
historical context of employment guarantee policies. Section II is devoted to the interface 
of gender issues and EGPs. We start by establishing the link between unpaid work and 
the economy and proceed to identify key areas in which new public job creation would 
reduce existing time burdens for women. Section III highlights selective aspects of the 
Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) of South Africa in regard to gender issues 
that were raised in the previous section, and concludes by summarizing briefly the 
employment and income outcomes of a hypothetical simulation that contemplates scaling 






                                                 
3 They include sectoral growth trends that favor large-scale enterprises and dismantle medium-size and/or 
small-size firms, overall low employment intensity of investment, war and conflict, international 
agreements that privilege the economies of some countries while disadvantaging others, the weakening of 
the state’s ability to exercise expansionary monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies, integration 
difficulties of specific groups into the economy, deeply rooted inequalities in access to resources and to 
education, rural seasonal unemployment, and the precarious nature of self-employment (Islam 2004; Cornia 
2004; Milanovic 2003).   4
I. EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE POLICIES 
 
The idea of government acting as the employer of last resort by guaranteeing 
employment, has a very long history that can be traced back to enlightened rulers in 
India–as far back as the fourth and fourteenth century–who introduced such programs to 
avert famine (Drèze and Sen 1989). Over the years, many countries have undertaken 
what has variably been known as “employment guarantee schemes,” “public employment 
programs,” “food for work,” and “public works programs.” Such government-led relief 
projects have been implemented to provide the means of survival to those most affected 
by natural disasters and economic crises (Hirway and Terhal 1994). In most cases, these 
were temporary emergency programs, which were to be phased out as conditions 
improved; however, the case has also been made for using such measures on a permanent 
basis (Minsky 1986, Papadimitriou 1998, Wray 2007, Mitchell 2001) to guard against the 
many undesirable effects of underemployment and to promote the right to a job as a 
guaranteed entitlement.    
 
Historical Foundations of ELR and EGPs in the North and the Global South
4 
In the period following the industrial revolution, countries with relatively well-developed 
markets in the North experienced periodic production and financial recessions. Despite 
colonial rule that provided them with cheap raw materials, ample product markets and 
other privileges, crises kept reoccurring and unemployment swings followed suit. Against 
the prevailing wisdom, J.M. Keynes understood early on that underemployment of labor 
and other resources was part and parcel of the normal functioning of the market-oriented 
economic system. Full employment equilibrium in his view was rather the exception. The 
Great Depression validated his views quite powerfully as unemployment in the United 
States stood at 25 percent by 1933. His earlier views had recommended government 
intervention as the only solution to pushing the economy away from a stagnant state and 
policymakers were now listening, at last.   
A much-cited example is that of the New Deal program, an intervention beyond 
the current uses of countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy. Introduced by Roosevelt in 
the United States in 1933, it provided direct public employment to the jobless in a host of 
                                                 
4 Kaboub 2007    5
different project areas (Kaboub 2007). Environmental and electrification projects were 
developed alongside the construction of new roads, bridges, schools, and other related 
public assets. Unemployment fell dramatically but for political reasons the program was 
discontinued a few years later. Nonetheless, in the years that followed many economists 
were converted to the notion that another depression was possible and that it was the 
business of government to implement countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy. Some 
economists, prominently among them Sir William Beveridge
5, but also John Pierson and 
John Philip Wernette called for the government to guarantee full employment through 
direct job creation at fair wages, as needed (Kaboub 2007). Stabilization policies were 
adopted widely in most countries, but the institutionalization of employment guarantee as 
a policy instrument was short lived and overall it did not take a stronghold. 
At the same time, around the middle of the last century, economists concerned 
with development issues began to view public employment creation programs as a means 
to address the endemic problem of low levels of employment and the concomitant 
underutilization of labor resources. Hirway (2007) traces this view to Nurkse and 
Hirchman and more recently to Tinbergen who have argued that surplus labor in 
developing economies suffered from a shortage of capital formation and that constructing 
productive assets would expand employment opportunities while potentially encouraging 
crowding-in of new investment. Tinbergen in particular, viewed public works programs 
as “transitional” ones that moved a labor surplus economy closer to full employment 
through “strategic use of surplus labor” in generating productive assets that, although 
needed, the private sector would not provide (Hirway 2007).  
Hyman Minsky (1986), an economist mostly known for his work on financial 
fragility, cited the need for governments to serve as an employer of last resort (ELR). In 
his view market economies did not possess an internal mechanism to identically match 
jobs to those seeking them. Concerned with poverty in the United States, he advocated 
that the “war on poverty” ought to be fought through public job creation. Much like the 
liquidity role that the U.S. Federal Reserve facilitates in financial markets, in labor 
markets only the government could create “an infinitely elastic demand for labor at a 
                                                 
5 In his book, Full Employment in a Free Society, Beveridge advocated that the government ought to 
guarantee full employment, which for him was defined as always having more available vacancies than 
unemployed people, not slightly fewer jobs than those who need them   6
floor or minimum wage that does not depend upon long- and short-run profit expectations 
of business. Since only government can divorce the offering of employment from the 
profitability of hiring workers, the infinitely elastic demand for labor must be created by 
government” (Minsky 1986).  
Minsky envisioned ELR as a permanent policy whereby the state assumes a 
buffer-stock employment role, absorbing the unemployed during contractionary periods 
and releasing them back into the market as needed. In addition to providing much needed 
jobs, ELR would have the added benefit of price stabilization, as it would reduce wage 
fluctuations over the medium term.  In the late 1980s and 1990s the role of the 
government as provider of social entitlements and guarantor of employment disappeared 
from the policy dialogue table. Instead, it gave way to the “invisible hand” in the form of 
neo-liberal policies in the north and structural adjustment policies in the south. The role 
of the state was to be minimized through the selling of public assets and drastic 
reductions in public services; expanded and highly unregulated entrepreneurial freedom 
was presumed to result in economic growth that would take care in a more efficient 
manner all of citizen’s needs that the newly diminished role of the state would no longer 
provide.  
This exclusive emphasis on market-driven growth and price stabilization as the 
singular anchor of monetary policy also culminated in the polarity of “good economic 
outcome/bad social outcome” thinking. The former (economic policy) was understood as 
creating an economic environment conducive to investment and growth, predicated 
among other things on “smaller government.” The latter (social policy) was assigned the 
responsibility of supporting the vulnerable, poor, and poorest in an attempt to create a 
more humane and equitable society by providing a safety net (Barrientos et al. 2005). 
  Indigence, increased vulnerability, lack of employment opportunities, 
precariousness in job creation, sub-living standard wages, spatial displacement and 
deterioration of income distribution are viewed as social ills to be relegated to poverty 
alleviation programs. Yet, the root cause, the very economic policy orientation that 
contributes to the “ills” remained intact. As the government reduced its public goods 
provisioning and service delivery role and as economic outcomes failed to promote a 
more equitable and just society, inequalities ended up rising and thus, much of social   7
protection policy pointed towards compensatory measures and away from entitlements. 
By assigning to social policy what economic policy was breeding we ended up with 
ineffective interventions (Cagatay and Elson 2000; Antonopoulos and Fontana 2006; 
Razavi 2007).  
If the inability of the markets to generate sufficient employment is taken up as a 
serious problem, it is essential to consider ELR and EGPs as permanent policies–not 
temporary measures–much like Central Bank interventions. Budgetary allocations and 
institutional frameworks must be developed in ways that make them viable instruments 
with a long horizon in mind (Wray 2007). In developing and developed countries, fiscal 
restraint and the drive to streamline government spending led to a shift away from 
“entitlements” and towards “self reliance.” At present a post-Washington consensus has 
opened up space for policy reversals in that government spending is contemplated once 
again as necessary and desirable (Sachs et al. 2004, Roy et al. 2006) and this presents an 
opportune moment for rethinking the role of employment guarantee instruments.  
 
Broader Aims of EGPs 
Based on the supposition that protracted unemployment, discouraged worker effects, and 
forced “inactivity” are cyclical and/or structural problems in the global south and north 
alike, ELR and EGPs are entitlement programs that guarantee the right to a job (Forstater 
1998, Mitchell 2001, Papadimitriou 1998). In cases of structural unemployment, when 
combined with other interventions that promote community-based assets and small 
enterprises, ELR programs can result in localized engines of economic development. 
They are not proposed as a panacea. Rather, they tackle poverty that is experienced by 
those whose income deprivation and social exclusion is due to joblessness.  Finally, 
although they contribute to poverty alleviation, such government initiatives were not 
envisioned as “targeted” social protection programs for the poor; they were meant to 
provide a universal guarantee of employment, an entitlement on demand, and for the 
duration deemed necessary by the participating members themselves. In effect, the design 
of projects has historically resulted in self-targeting and this has been discussed 
extensively elsewhere.    8
In the twenty-first century many economists view employment guarantee 
programs as a means to promoting pro-poor development (Bhaduri 2005, Kregel 2006). 
EGP and ELR interventions could modify the economic growth path so as to include 
segments of the population that are excluded from remunerative productive employment 
if space is created for labor-intensive based development (ILO, EIIP). Within such policy 
space, the adoption of well designed projects will lead to job creation for the unemployed 
and “inactive” poor, contributing to (1) prevention of starvation and eradication of 
poverty of the poor at the bottom, (2) regeneration of natural resources, which are rapidly 
depleting and degrading under the neo-liberal policies and on which the livelihood of the 
majority of population depends, (3) growth of agriculture and allied activities that would 
establish strong linkages between primary and non primary sectors, and (4) construction 
of infrastructure that would improve quality of life as well as create enabling conditions 
for overall economic growth (Hirway 2006).  
These features also make EGPs an ideal tool for achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). For the most part, discussion on the feasibility of the 
MDGs has focused on the lack of financing resources and on ways of bridging the 
funding gap, with many ongoing exercises centered on the costing of MDGs. Their 
objective is to gauge the total resource requirement of achieving the MDGs. Resource 
allocation and policy selection is critical in this context, and guaranteeing employment 
ought to be given due consideration especially within the MDG framework.  
There are multiple channels through which employment can speed up the 
achievement of MDG targets and many have focused on this issue recently. (Islam 2006, 
and numerous publications of the UNDP International Poverty Centre in Brasilia). Well-
designed employment guarantee policies for necessary infrastructure and social services 
can go a long way toward the achievement of MDGs. A good place to start would be to 
include an employment-intensity mandate for all MDG related projects (for physical and 
social infrastructural asset creation). 
Government led job creation has not only been advocated at the theoretical level. 
Over the years, India, South Africa, Argentina, Ethiopia, Korea, Peru, Bangladesh, 
Ghana, Cambodia, France and Chile, among many others, have intermittently adopted   9
policies that effectively rendered them “employers of last resort.” There exists a large 
degree of variation between countries in regard to the reason programs were initiated.  
Often, especially in Latin America, these programs have been used as part of a 
populist agenda as in the case of short lived “social funds.” In other cases, for example in 
the Indian state of Maharashtra, they became permanent basic entitlements during 
seasonal unemployment and drought periods since the mid-1970’s; yet, in other 
instances, i.e., Argentina in 2001 and Korea in 1997, to ameliorate the after-effects of a 
financial crisis; in Bangladesh and Ethiopia, to enhance food security; and in South 
Africa, to alleviate chronic poverty and increase employment among the most devastated 
pockets of the population in the post-apartheid era
6. 
 In addition to duration and motivation in jump-starting such programs, 
differences also exist in the source of financing, types of projects undertaken, selection 
criteria for participation, mode of remuneration, institutional arrangements, degree of 
decentralization, level of transparency and community involvement, and length of 
guaranteed employment for participants.  
 
II. GENDER DIMENSIONS OF EGPs 
 
While not the case in every single country, on a world scale the majority of the 1.3 billion 
people living in poverty are women. The vulnerability of women to poverty is strongly 
linked to the gender division of labor in paid and unpaid work (as well as asymmetries in 
access to and decision making over use of assets and resources). They are income-poor, 
but also overtly taxed in terms of the time they allocate in caring for the sick, fetching the 
wood, collecting the water, preparing meals, etc. As a consequence, the overhead unpaid 
work time (Harvey and Taylor 2000) that poor women have to spend in securing inputs 
for household production use and in providing care for family members is of concern and 
constitutes a dimension of asymmetry between them and the rest of the population 
(Budlender 2002).  
An intuitive way of grasping poor women’s positions is arrived at by estimating 
(a) the number of paid hours they would need to work to reach the poverty line and (b) 
                                                 
6 An Appendix at the end of this paper provides more detail on country level experiences.    10
adding to that the number of hours of unpaid work they perform
7. In South Africa for the 
year 2000 (and leaving aside for the moment the fact that employment opportunities may 
not have existed) unskilled women would have had to work four extra hours
8 per day to 
earn the poverty level income, as compared to unskilled men.
9 Meanwhile, Time Use 
Survey data (2000) reveal that women on average spend two extra hours and fifteen 
minutes on unpaid work each day
10, which adds up to about six extra hours of work per 
day for women vis-à-vis men. Besides being income poor, women’s time for sleep, self-
care, political participation, and relaxation is unfairly taxed on both accounts, as 
explained above.   
Among poor women, who are primarily the main providers of unpaid work and 
unpaid care work for their households and communities, infrastructure that enhances 
access to communal resource inputs and provisioning of basic social services is of 
extreme importance. To make sensible use of public funds, a selection criterion for EGP 
projects requires that participants be provided with productive and useful jobs. A key 
finding in reviewing a number of EGP projects is that they consistently miss thousands of  
“hidden vacancies” that can potentially expand the menu of new employment-intensive 
projects. These productive but “hidden” jobs exist in invisible unpaid work areas that can 
                                                 
7 This is a modified version of Vickery’s (1977) seminal paper on time poverty which was based on the 
idea that the working poor (versus the non-poor) need to spend longer hours performing paid work if they 
are to secure sufficient income just to reach the poverty line. She then proceeded to argue that they would 
have less time for household production, keeping free time as an inviolable constant at about 10 hrs per day 
while in our view it is the “free time” that is reduced, resulting in decreasing human capabilities and health 
effects.   
8 Author’s calculation: women received on average roughly seven or eight rand per hour and men around 
eleven to twelve.  Given existing wage differentials of unskilled females to males to earn 560 rand per 
month men needed to work 50 hrs per week; women needed to devote forty percent more hrs to reach the 
level of income. The four extra hours estimate is based on a five day week at 10 hours per day for men. 
Alternatively, for a six day per week scheduled work, men would need to work around 8 hrs a day and 
women around 13 hrs.  
9 Hourly wage calculations are based on LFS 2000 and TUS 2000. The year 2000 is chosen for consistency 
purposes as TUS was conducted in this year. Calculations are from the Levy research project on “Impact of 
Employment Guarantee Policies on pro-poor growth and gender equality” with particular contributions 
from Kalie Pauw and Rosemary Leaver.  
10 For comparison, it is worth noting that the equivalent figure in the Netherlands and France is around two 
hours while in Italy and Mexico it is over four and a half hours. UNDP (2006) Human Development 
Report, UNDP: (New York) and ECLAC (2007) Women’s Contribution to Equality in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. In Benin for instance, collecting water and wood and carrying it home takes on average 
three and a half months of women’s time per year (Charmes and Hirway 2006).  We must also note that for 
the majority of countries the combined paid/unpaid work time for women is higher (Antonopoulos 
forthcoming). 
   11
be reduced if EGPs include projects that result in (a) asset creation that facilitates gaining 
access to goods that are gathered from communal lands through unpaid work, such as 
water and firewood (b) assets that enhance productivity in subsistence unpaid work and 
unpaid family work of products destined to reach markets (c) direct replacement of 
unpaid work in the area of public service delivery of care. All these represent valuable 
inputs for poor people, and women in particular, as they enter into livelihoods: from 
tending gardens, cooking food, providing sanitation of living quarters to home 
maintenance and caring for the ill. 
In poor communities, deficits in public service delivery are compensated for by 
long hours of unpaid work performed mostly by women and children. This work is 
undervalued, undercounted, and unprotected. Perhaps, not quite considered proper 
“work” it has also remained “invisible” to employment guarantee job creation. If projects 
are created in these areas, women may undertake some of these EGP jobs, but not 
necessarily. Men may also do so, and that would be an interesting process of 
transforming gender relations within households and communities. Worth may be 
assigned to paid care activities anew, and that would be a welcomed outcome since at the 
moment they are at the bottom of the wage structure in all countries.  In either case, the 
point to note here is that as road construction yields benefits, so too do water wells, 
woodlots, and provisioning of home-based care, to give some examples.  
 
Unpaid Work and the Economy 
Unpaid work activities entail every day routine household maintenance work, such as 
cooking, cleaning, shopping, and caring for family and community. It also includes 
providing care to the chronically ill in hospitals due to lack of nurse-aides, sanitation 
personnel, cooks, etc; or at home, due to shortened hospital stays dictated by structural 
adjustment policies of the late 80s and 90s. It is time spent performing unpaid work in 
these areas that we will refer to as “subsidies” to public sector service provisioning 
(Picchio 2003, Antonopoulos and Fontana 2006).  
In developing countries in particular, a substantial amount of time is spent to 
provide for the health, water, sanitation, and other needs of the family. This may be due 
to insufficient income, and hence inability to buy services in the market, or due to public   12
sector deficits in provisioning, or both. Time use data and satellite accounts allow for 
estimations of the volume of unpaid work performed in provisioning of goods and service 
delivery that households do not have alternative means of accessing. This is beyond the 
scope of this paper but it suffices to mention that recent UNIFEM estimates of unpaid 
work performed by women and children indicates the production of over eighteen trillion 
USD of goods and services annually.  
This work places an enormous time-tax on some people asymmetrically, 
particularly on poor women and children in developing countries, limiting other aspects 
of social engagement. In some cases, it reduces the time spent in self-employment, 
subsistence production of foodstuffs and market participation; a case in point here is 
taking care of HIV/AIDS patients in Sub-Saharan Africa which pushes poor families 
deeper into poverty.  In other cases it limits involvement in political processes, attending 
school and to medical appointments, skill upgrading, artistic expression, community 
participation, and leisure. Internalized as one’s “destiny,” an unchangeable, unfortunate 
duty but still inviolable obligation, the disproportionate engagement of parts of the 
population in unpaid care work can lead to social exclusion, time-poverty, and even to 
depletion of human capabilities. 
Gender dimensions of EGP are pertinent in two distinct areas
11. The first relates to 
women’s equitable access to jobs created through EGP, which would result in appropriate 
men and women participation ratios. Much like women’s participation in labor markets, 
this requires that female supply of labor issues are addressed (Krishnaraj et al. 2004a and 
2004b). The second entails project design that is responsive to asset creation and service 
delivery that poor women need (King-Desjardin 1996). At the local level, women’s 
participation and input is crucial is determining specific projects. At the aggregate level, 
and given women’s responses in focus groups and other NGO studies which provide 
ample testimony to that effect, time use data reveal the types of jobs that would result in 
reducing unpaid work and unpaid care burdens.  The following then can be asked and 
answered: 
a) Under what conditions will women and men be able to register for available jobs on 
an equal footing?  
                                                 
11 for a thorough introduction see King-Desjardin (1996).   13
The issue here is whether gender differentiated entry barriers and job assignment 
segregation exist in such programs and the extent to which such barriers can be identified 
and removed at the design phase. Existing patterns of division of labor, social 
reproduction, reproductive health issues, and other relevant specificities come into play, 
which require appropriate provisions to ensure female participation. Some of these entail 
location of work site and length of work day; equal pay for equal and comparable work 
(time-motion studies); gendered nature of work assignments which may exclude women 
from some jobs; mode of remuneration, piece rate or day schedule for example; 
availability of crèche (an on-site childcare provision); and allocated time and shade to 
feed young children.  
Observed ratios of registered men to women give a clear indication on the issue. 
What may be easy interventions to allow women to participate in larger numbers?  It is 
tempting to draw conclusions and provide a tentative answer by reviewing the existing 
literature but a much more in depth analysis is required. These interventions are of 
importance clearly, but so are male-migration patterns, whether women are heads of 
households or not, whether gaining access to market jobs is easier for men than women, 
etc.  
There exists immense variation across countries in regard to participation rates 
and equitable remuneration between men and women, as the Appendix A highlights. The 
existing evidence shows overwhelmingly that women want to enroll in EGP projects and 
wish to have a say in the choice of works (Tcherneva and Wray 2005, Devereux and 
Solomon 2006). A frequent issue that comes up is that institutional barriers exist that 
prohibit women from participating in decisions regarding selection of projects and, 
design, implementation, and evaluation, even when there is space for community 
participation.  
b) To what extent do projects that are oriented toward physical and social infrastructure 
assets benefit women via reducing unpaid work burdens?  
There is a severe deficit of gender-specific analysis of impacts of EGP infrastructure 
creation (Devereux 2005, Devereux and Solomon 2006). This points to the need to 
develop gender-aware models that can link EGP to household level data. From our 
perspective gender access to and ownership of various resources such as land are   14
important in determining and analyzing the types of assets that women and men benefit 
from. In addition, we need an analytical framework that can account for unpaid work 
before and after EGP. This would permit simulations that can inform the design of EGPs 
and also assess impacts on households of different socioeconomic characteristics and on 
women in particular.  
A gender informed analysis, from our perspective, would have as its starting point 
the recognition that women are the bearers of responsibilities for most social reproduction 
activities. As a consequence, women assign greater priority to EGP job creation that 
replaces unpaid work and results in assets that reduces unpaid work burdens
12.  Men, on 
the other hand, might emphasize improved access to markets and would therefore favor 
assets such as road construction and road maintenance. But these scenarios need to be 
contextualized in accordance with the variations throughout the world.  
The point is that if decision-making is bottom-up and women are included in the 
selection of labor-based programs, women will be able to make these critical decisions 
themselves. Lack of local involvement and participatory decision-making are often cited 
as reasons for the failure of EGP development projects in general. Without women’s 
inputs in selection, design, and implementation of employment creation programs, the 
risks of failure (especially with respect to meeting women’s needs and circumstances) are 
high, because they could not possibly take account of women’s and men’s different needs 
and expectations vis-à-vis various kinds of infrastructure.  
In India, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) incorporates 
several gender dimensions and provisions have been included mandating for example at 
least one third of its beneficiaries to be women; ensuring locally available employment, 
thus reducing a male-bias as men are more likely to migrate; allowing for spaces to feed 
and take care of children, etc. As compared to previous employment schemes in India, 
such as the Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS), National Rural Employment 
Programme (NREP), Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) and Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar 
Yojana (SGRY) these are credible advances on the gender front. Appendix A highlights 
gender dimensions of public employment for selected programs throughout the world. 
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Gender Awareness in Project Design  
Many low-income countries, in addition to large deficits in social services, face a severe 
lack of basic physical infrastructure. Water delivery systems, electrification, road 
construction, drainage and sanitation, buildings for schooling and health services are in 
short supply. More often than not, long unpaid work hours co-exist with deficits in 
employment, especially for unskilled workers. In some countries EGPs have taken the 
form of employment intensive infrastructure projects
13, which substitute labor for 
machines within the same budgetary allocation for creation of public physical assets, 
such as road construction in many African countries. A case in point here is the Expanded 
Public Works Programme in South Africa. In other cases projects are devised that 
guarantee a fixed number of workdays, as through the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act in rural India, which constitutionally mandates a hundred days of work per 
annum to rural poor unemployed workers
14.  
An important but overlooked aspect of these initiatives is that female participation 
rates have been very often high, which points to the existence of unemployment among 
women but also to hidden unemployment in the form of what is commonly referred to as 
the  “inactive” population. In Maharashtra, India, women comprise 53 percent of the 
program participants and earn about thirty percent of household income (Engkvist 1995). 
Chile’s Minimum Employment Program (PEM), originally set up in 1975, had reached a 
73 percent female participation rate by 1987 (Buvinic 1996). When the Jefes program 
was introduced in Argentina in 2001, it anticipated 400,000 participants, heads of 
households, and to the surprise of officials it reached close to two million people or five 
percent of the population (Tcherneva 2005). In a year’s time, 75 percent of registered 
participants were women. These programs therefore enhance employment opportunities 
for women. 
Nonetheless, public employment guarantee programs have generally invested 
much more in infrastructure projects such as construction and maintenance of roads and 
have placed less emphasis on projects that provide social services or those that target the 
                                                 
13 ILO 2003. 
14 Appendix B provides a short review of programs adopted in India, South Africa, and Argentina. These 
countries have in recent times engaged in extensive EGP initiatives as part of their national socioeconomic 
agenda. Many other country experiences, listed by region, have been summarized and can be found in the same 
Appendix to this paper.   16
efficiency and enhancement of public service delivery
15. Building a hospital will not be 
sufficient unless its staffing includes nurses’ aides, personnel that cleans and sanitizes the 
premises, prepares the meals, and assists the patients with daily functions. Encouraging 
educational attainment will require the construction of the physical space and the 
presence of a teacher. School attendance will be enhanced if girls are not required to help 
their families take care of the chronically ill at home by fetching water and providing 
care, as is often the case in households with HIV/AIDS virus inflicted members in many 
parts of the world. Implementation of these programs, when they address infrastructural 
deficits in public service will benefit women and children by alleviating work that is 
drudgery and places disproportionate time burdens on them. 
Public job guarantee programs designed with these concerns in mind will have 
three distinct benefits. First, it will generate income for participants, setting 
simultaneously a wage floor for all, including some benefits (depending on the design of 
the program).  These newly created jobs may or may not be always filled by women. It 
could be that women are the ones employed as construction workers while young men 
provide home-based care to those chronically ill. In all cases, in addition to income, 
capacity building and skill acquisition will be gained to varying degrees. Second, the 
goods and services delivered will become part of the basket of consumption for 
underserved communities and populations, in itself a contribution to pro-poor 
development. Third, and quite significant for promoting gender equality, this may turn 
out to be a very powerful redistributive policy of unpaid work burdens.  
The importance of employment guarantee programs in our context is that they can 
reduce, if well designed, unpaid work while redistributing the cost of reproduction by 
creating jobs for both women and men instead of reinforcing the existing gender based 
division of unpaid labor. If such projects are not gender informed, the danger is that they 
may create a typical “double” day effect for women. One way to avoid a “double” day for 
many women would be to socialize care work through EGPs. 
 
 
                                                 
15 One exception is the Jefes program in Argentina; a large number of projects are designed specifically to cater 
to community needs by providing a wide range of goods and services. (Tcherneva and Wray 2005). Also 
recently, some opening has been created within the Expanded Public Works Programmes in South Africa.   17
III. THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE 
 
South Africa is in a unique position regarding the potential of EGP’s to promote gender 
equality. Since the dismantling of apartheid in the early 1990s, South Africa has enacted 
several employment generation initiatives. Their mixed but encouraging success 
eventually culminated in the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), a 20 billion 
rand national initiative. Inaugurated in 2004 as a medium-term active labor market policy 
it aims to create one million new jobs for unemployed low-skilled workers over five 
years.
16  
One of the stated goals of the EPWP is to create jobs and reduce poverty among 
those who find themselves excluded from the mainstream economy, many of whom are 
women. According to recent estimates 30 percent of the population live below the  
poverty line
17 designated at R322 per month and women account for over half. In regard 
to unemployment, the official rate is around 30 percent for women and 21 percent for 
men. For African women and men, the official unemployment rates are higher, 36 percent 
and 26 percent respectively (LFS 2006). It is worth noting that women also comprise the 
majority of discouraged workers, at 62 percent. Age is also a significant predictor of 
unemployment and of “inactivity” (over 60 percent for those between the ages of 20-34 
years). 
If patterns continue unabated, South Africa’s current growth rate coupled with 
existing declining labor-intensity trends, unemployment will reach the range of 33 
percent by 2014. (Pollin et al. 2006). A recent study estimates that even under the most 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policy regime, unemployment will still be around 15 
percent
18. To redress the severity of unemployment, part of the accepted policy response 
includes employment creation through EPWP. Traditionally, both in South Africa and 
internationally, such initiatives have concentrated on labor-intensive infrastructural 
projects. Such projects aimed at the creation and/or maintenance of roads, bridges, etc. 
                                                 
16 The EPWP was introduced as a repackaging of the successful elements of the Community Based Public 
Works Programme (CBPWP) and the Poverty Relief Fund, largely modelled on the Gundo Lashu project 
(McCord, 2004), a program implemented in 2001 through the Limpopo Province Roads Agency with funding 
from DFID – South Africa and technical assistance from the ILO (ILO 2007).  
17  Income and Expenditures Survey (2005), Statistics South Africa  
18 Pollin et al. (2006)  
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These have been extremely important and the ILO has been a strong partner of such 
initiatives for over ten years now.  
From a gender perspective though, some types of projects, equally if not more 
labor intensive, are critically important and EPWP has already created the policy space 
for social sector infrastructural projects to be undertaken. Provided that multiple 
stakeholders (women, policy makers, community organizations, NGO’s) enter a 
productive dialogue that points out what is mostly needed at the community level, EPWP 
can occupy a unique place in the international arena of pro-poor, pro-gender equality 
project design.  
EPWP consists of four sectors and three among them are most pertinent in the 
context of our discussion: the infrastructure, environmental, and most importantly the 
social sector. If projects are designed in ways that are aware of the extra burdens placed 
on poor women, women can benefit in two distinct ways: first and foremost, their unpaid 
work burdens (including unpaid care work) can be reduced and second, women can 
benefit by enrolling in such projects as workers and receiving income. But what is 
critically important is that women who are presumed to be the beneficiaries of such 
projects are actively invited to participate at the level of design and implementation from 
the very beginning of the process. This will not only be empowering for women but will 
result in assets and services that will allow “ownership” of the process and its benefits. 
Making it a priority to reduce unpaid care work in general and to ensure that when 
women participate as EPWP workers they do not end up working even longer hours 
(combined paid and unpaid work time) is very important.  
The specific choice and design of EPWP employment intensive projects must clearly 
emerge by careful consideration of local conditions and, in our view as we already stated, 
through community-based planning where the “voices” of those presumed to benefit 
provide key inputs to project design. The examples we provide below are simply 
indicative of the range of projects and jobs that could reduce the unpaid work (time-
taxing) burdens on women: 
•  construction of durable housing and latrines for ultra poor and poor households 
•   construction of approach roads, feeder roads, paving of internal roads 
•   construction of water harvesting structures and improving traditional structures   19
•   regeneration of common lands, plantation, and reforestation 
•  laying of water pipelines in underserved areas 
•  organizing the collection and distribution of water and firewood 
•  construction of public use ovens and midday meal kitchens  
•  waste land (public) development; watershed development for land cultivation 
•  home-based care assistance for the bed-ridden and disabled and mobile clinics 
•   early childhood development  
•   nurses aides and custodial personnel for clinics and hospitals 
•   school teachers’ assistants,  day care assistants for children of EGP workers and  
low income households  
It is extremely encouraging that most of the above suggestions can be easily 
incorporated within the existing framework of EPWP. Many projects would be classified 
under the infrastructure and environment sectors. Still, the focus and specificities of the 
design of these projects would end up promoting gender equality and reducing drudgery. 
One can imagine the collection and distribution of water and wood and the cleaning up 
after permanent patients being provided by trained young men, leaving more time for 
women to engage in other activities, productive, political, or self-caring ones. Such 
interventions will improve productivity of labor (unpaid and paid), may result in 
crowding-in, but above all they will make living with dignity a stronger possibility.  
Especially important is the inclusion of Home and community-based care (HCBC) as 
well as early childhood development (ECD) programs within the social sector.  To make 
these effective interventions though, appropriate budgetary allocations must be made 
with the focus on improving livelihoods of poor women and their communities. At the 
moment, EPWP provides  (1) R15 billion for infrastructure investments–increasing the 
labor-intensity of government-funded infrastructure projects, including building of roads, 
bridges, and irrigation systems; (2) R4 billion for environmental investments–creating 
work opportunities in public environmental improvement programs; and (3) R600 million 
for social services–creating work opportunities in public social programs, with a focus on 
home-based care workers and early childhood development.  
It is our view, we must note, that much more is needed in this area. Though of 
critical importance, existing projects should be expanded beyond the current focus on   20
“learnerships” for people that provide care to HIV/AIDS patients and their children.  The 
burdens of unpaid work, which women and children perform while caring for PLWA, 
must become visible and alternatives must be made available through specific social 
sector EPWP job creation within the social sector. In addition, the budgetary allocations 
seem to be extremely restricted. We must also keep in mind, as explained previously, that 
there is an interface between income poverty and time poverty, and women in poor 
households that have PLWA suffer all the more. Therefore, parallel to cash benefits 
currently stipulated, to even the playing field, EPWP care workers should be provided not 
only with training but also with work hours to substitute for unpaid work of overworked 
household members. In addition to current duties they can be assisting with fuel and 
water collection when needed, household maintenance that becomes overbearing when 
nursing someone around the clock, assisting with transportation and attending of 
appointments, etc
19.  
Despite notable improvements from previous initiatives in targeting, it has been 
argued that the EPWP may not offer the best poverty alleviation strategy for South Africa 
primarily because it provides employment too short in duration and it pays low wages 
(Streak and van der Westhuizen 2004). Given the short duration of employment, the 
EPWP has the potential to function well in the context of cyclical problems of varying 
degrees of severity, but to make a dent in structural unemployment the program would 
need to be scaled up (McCord 2004). The view is clearly emerging that in achieving its 
poverty reduction goal EPWP should be scaled up.  
The results of the EPWP mid-term reviews are not publicly available yet. Among 
previous program evaluations, opinions differ in regard to the issue of targeting versus 
self-selection. Targeting, especially that of women, was a major difference between the 
Gundo Lashu and the Zibambele programs. While both programs used a wage right 
below the prevailing minimum in an attempt at efficient self-selection targeting, the 
Gundo Lashu program also used official quotas for participation articulated in the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 1997 as a secondary criterion (60% women, subsequently 
lowered to 40% under the EPWP, 20% youth aged between 18 and 25 years, and 2% 
                                                 
19 There is a dearth of information in regard to detailed nationally representative studies and data collection on 
household coping mechanisms and unpaid work.  Proper evaluation of EPWP projects ought to  remedy this.  
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those with disabilities), allowing for the inclusion of a broad demographic grouping in the 
program. In the Zibambele program, in contrast, poverty is explicitly used as the targeting 
criterion, and within the group identified as the poor, membership of female-headed 
households is used as the next criterion to reach the subset of the most disadvantaged. 
Thus, while both programs address poverty in their policy objectives, the Zibambele 
program uses criteria that are more likely to ensure that the poor participate (McCord 
2004). 
 
Scaling up the Social Sector?  
By its very nature social sector job creation is highly employment intensive as its 
activities are primarily service delivery focused. It is then reasonable to make the 
assumption that in comparison to infrastructural projects it uses more labor and fewer 
machines or other intermediate inputs, although some budgetary allocations would be 
devoted to materials and administration. If we classify labor inputs according to skill 
level and gender in four categories, the likelihood of unskilled females becoming EPWP 
workers in social service delivery is quite high.  
In what follows we report some preliminary results of one extreme experiment 
that serves as a benchmark for other simulations but also highlights the differences of 
EPWP job creation that attracts and provides jobs to female unskilled persons, especially 
originating in ultra poor households, in the delivery of public services (which would 
substitute for unpaid work and unpaid care work). This may be achieved through 
targeting or self-selection. The example is chosen for illustrative purposes and is part of a 
much larger exercise that aims to detect the impacts of employment guarantee policies on 
income, primary and secondary employment, growth of output, and expansion of fiscal 
space for the case of South Africa
20.   
The benchmark experiment allocates R10 billion in direct unskilled labor 
employment and traces the impacts on the rest of the economy, thus isolating secondary 
income multiplier effects from other sectoral secondary income effects. The highest 
                                                 
20 A full report will be made available in the middle of November. The LIGESA (Levy Institute Gender 
SAM South Africa) is based on the PROVIDE SAM 2000 for South Africa and was modified to include 
gender dimensions by a team of South African Economists. Cecilia Punt, team leader of PROVIDE, and 
Kalie Pauw provided invaluable inputs. Rudi von Arnim, Marzia Fontana, Taun Toay provided valuable 
inputs and Haider Khan served as an external advisor.     22
impact is for female unskilled workers, for which the increase is 25 percent, reflecting 
their initial small share in total income. Other labor categories benefit as well, indirectly. 
Indirect job creation is highest for the female unskilled under the “male unskilled” 
scenario. A striking, but expected, result is that the income of the ultra-poor increases the 
most (by over 63 percent) when public work employment income is effectively channeled 
to them. Overall, it is households in urban slums that benefit more than households in 
other locations. The result that deserves most attention is that the highest impact on 
poverty reduction is achieved when female unskilled labor is targeted. The effect is larger 
than when unskilled males are targeted suggesting some important gender implications. 
The household group that appears to benefit the most from expansion of unskilled female 
employment is that of African households located in urban slums. Finally, the increase in 
GDP is estimated to be about 2.6 and in the absence of leakages (import-export, etc.) 




There is a particular urgency, and immense opportunity, to place the institutionalization 
of employment guarantee on the public dialogue table. The basic idea is straightforward: 
governments must step in to fill the employment deficit lackluster investment or jobless 
growth creates.  We should not miss the opportunity to confront this issue, especially as 
we talk about the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, poverty 
alleviation, and pro-poor growth. Well-designed public job creation has the potential to 
steer the economy in a direction that is both efficient and equitable and to improve 
women’s position by reducing the time-tax imposed on them. 
Perhaps an even stronger argument for EGPs rests with the fact that joblessness 
has repercussions that extend beyond income loss. Amartya Sen
21 summarizes it aptly in 
Development as Freedom: “There is plenty of evidence that unemployment has many far-
reaching effects other than loss of income, including psychological harm, loss of work 
motivation, skill and self-confidence, increase in ailments and morbidity (and even 
mortality rates), disruption of family relations and social life, hardening of social 
exclusion, and accentuation of racial tensions and gender asymmetries.”  
                                                 
21 This quotation is from Wray and Forstater  2004.   23
Finally, one cannot place enough emphasis on the ethical importance of avoiding 
exclusion of segments of the population from employment opportunities (Wray and 
Forstater 2004). It has been convincingly argued that “forced” migration, ethnic 
antagonism, susceptibility to dangerous ideologies, and anti-democratic political 
movements are linked to economic deprivation (Nafziger et al. 2000, Ocampo 2006). The 
argument for full employment is indeed based on the idea that the right to work is 
important in and of itself (Wray and Forstater 2004).  
Access to a job is not a panacea. Healthy growth rates, environmental 
sustainability, decent work conditions, and a government that safeguards public good 
provisioning on a permanent base and strives for universal entitlements are key 
ingredients for a humane, caring economy. But for the poor and ultra poor willing to 
work and not having access to a job, public inaction constitutes social assignment of 
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COUNTRY   PROGRAM    GENDER  DIMENSIONS 
 
Argentina    Programa de Jefes y Jefas de  High female participation (69%) was an  
Hogar Desocupados (JHD)   unintended by-product of program design.  
Social service projects were gender informed, i.e. 
skill creation as carpenters, establishment of  
community soup kitchens and childcare centres. 
 
Bangladesh   Maintenance and tree plantation   On average, 60,000 women participate annually.  
under the Local Government   Institutionalized equal pay for equal and  
Engineering Department (LGED)   comparable work established. Provides a  
training component as well.  
 
Rural Maintenance     Employs women as laborers and supervisors for 
Programme (RMP)     a period four years, plus provides training.  
 
Bolivia    Emergency Social Fund (ESF)   Benefited over 1 million poor over 4 years, less  
      t h a n   1 %   o f   w h o m   w e r e   w o m e n .  
 
Botswana   Labour-Based Relief Programme   60-70% female participation; offers time for  
and Labour-Intensive Rural   breastfeeding without pay-cut implications and 
Public Works Programme    the promotion of women to supervisory roles. 
 
Chile     Minimum Employment     75% of the workers were women versus only 
Program (PEM)      30% in the higher paying Program for Heads of  
Households (POJH).  
 
El Salvador    Fund for Social Investment   Works closely with NGOs and other community- 
(FIS)       based  groups  in  targeting  women. 
 
Indonesia   Padat Karya programs     Low participation rates for women at only 19%.  
 
Malawi    WFP Food-for-work     Women were over-represented due self-selection 
    from  males’  monopoly  on  MASAF’s  cash  wages. 
  
Malawi Social Action     PWPs offered targets of 40% female participation 
Fund  (MASAF).      with actual rates ranging from 42% (road 
rehabilitation) to 27% (bridge work contracts).  
 
Peru     Programa de Apoyo al     Targeted women, but often delegated them to 
Ingreso Temporal (PAIT)    inferior roles that men would not tolerate.  
 
Senegal    Agetip         Lacked cooperation mechanisms with NGOs and  
did not have poverty criteria, resulting in limited 
impacts on the lives of women and the very poor.  
 
Sri Lanka   National Housing Development   Through Community Development Councils  
Authority (NHDA)    (CDC), women organized and supervised  
construction work.  
 
Uganda     Various rural public works   Despite CBO selection, women’s representation 
programs in the west   and  participation  are  limited;  although,  women 
play a stronger role relative to Sierra Leone. 
 
Zambia   Micro-Project Unit (MPU)   Despite task-based divisions, women were still  
forced to “subcontract” men for some of the 
tasks. 
 
Food for Work       Social-infrastructure creation was 90% female. 
  
Zimbabwe   Rural Transport Study (RTS)   Program design incorporated input and  
  sponsored programs    participation of women, reducing burdens  
associated with travel and transport costs.   33
APPENDIX B  
 
India  
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA): The experience of India is quite 
unique. For many decades, popular mobilization sought to link public job creation to the 
“right to a job,” the “right to food,” and other basic entitlements, and many schemes were 
adopted as detailed below. These efforts culminated in the historic passage of the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) in August 2005, making India the 
first country ever to provide legal enforcement of the entitlement to the right to work as 
part and parcel of the fundamental right to live a life with dignity. This employment 
guarantee legislation provides manual labor to poor rural workers at the statutory 
minimum wage for up to 100 days. The act came into force in the poorest 200 rural 
districts on February 2, 2006, and is due to be extended to the whole of rural India within 
five years. 
Prior to the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, India had witnessed a 
long history of employment generation schemes. The Employment Guarantee Scheme of 
Maharashtra (EGS) was introduced in 1972/73, when the State of Maharashtra faced an 
acute drought. The initiative guarantees work to any who apply, which must be provided 
within 15 days of being demanded. The permissible works are rural, especially 
agricultural, infrastructure (which includes minor irrigation works), soil conservation, 
afforestation, de-silting of tanks, stone-cutting and road construction and maintenance. 
Wages are paid at piece rates. The 1989 Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) merged two 
operational programs, the National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) and the Rural 
Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP), which have mandates similar to 
the EGS. An important and novel innovation is that 80 percent of the combined central 
and state budgets for JRY were released directly to the Village Panchayat, to be utilized 
for village works, with the remaining 20 percent being spent by the District Rural 
Development Agency (DRDA). JRY stipulated that 30 percent of employment 
opportunities should be given to women. JRY was initially dispersed throughout India, 
without any specific focus on “backward areas” until late 1993, when it started to 
concentrate on “backward districts.” The JRY has been restructured and renamed the 
Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (JGSY), in which each Gram Panchayat has    34
responsibility for preparing an annual action plan for taking up works, according to the 
felt needs of the people. (Hirway and Terhal 1994, Devereux and Solomon 2006).  
NREGA has many similar features but also some distinguishing ones. Most 
notable among them is the accompanying Right to Information Act (RTI). From an 
institutional legislative point of view, the RTI Act provides citizens’ access to any 
records held by the government or its agencies. The NREGA also makes references to 
transparency and accountability, citizen access to copies of records, and social audits. 
The guidelines detail proactive disclosure, whereby the government has a duty to inform 
people; providing access to all records for inspection, and the right to receive certified 
copies of any document on demand; and social audits, an ongoing process through which 
citizens can participate in the monitoring and implementation of the NREGA. It gives any 
citizen the legitimacy, to not only seek information, but also to record complaints, make 
suggestions, and demand answers in the public domain within a two-week time frame.  
The second notable aspect is that NREGA includes several gender dimensions. 
Gender provisions have been included, mandating, for example, at least one third of its 
beneficiaries be women; ensuring locally available employment, thus reducing male 
rural-urban migration and lessening women’s workload; allowing for spaces to feed and 
take care of children; and providing maternity leave time without penalty. As compared 
to previous employment schemes in India, such as the Employment Assurance Scheme 
(EAS), National Rural Employment Programme (NREP), Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY), 
and Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY), these are credible advances on the 
gender front.  
But challenges remain. The importance of the Right to Information Act must be 
re-emphasized. It has made possible the inclusion of a gender perspective in social audits. 
Over 100 sites are being investigated, and the evidence is coming out. The overall finding 
is that women’s participation in a selection of works is crucial. Members participating in 
social audits stress the “need to ensure that works focus on reducing women’s workloads 
and enhance the availability and productivity of local natural resources, which are critical 
sources of livelihood activities for women.” Online discussions through Solution 
Exchange provided documentation to this effect. This is a virtual space sponsored by the 
United Nations Country Team in India, and it offers development practitioners space to   35
provide and benefit from each other's observations. Several ongoing discussions are 
extremely pertinent to NRGEGA. (www.solutionexchange-un.net.in).  
 
Argentina 
Programa de Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (JHD) was born via a presidential 
decree in January 2002 and signed into law on April 3, 2002. It represents the 
government’s primary program to deal with the economic crisis that faced Argentina with 
the collapse of its currency board in 2001. Other safety net programs were reduced to 
shift funding to Jefes. Between April 3 and May 17, 2002, unemployed heads of 
households with underage children, persons with handicaps, or a pregnant woman were 
eligible and registered in a national database in preparation for program implementation. 
Jefes paid half of the poverty line income for half-time work, approximately the 
equivalent of US$ 160 per month in exchange for 20 hours of work in community 
projects, including community services, small construction, maintenance activities, and 
participation in training programs, including finishing basic education. 
The Jefes program had reached around 2 million beneficiaries by the end of 2003. 
One of the most surprising results of the program was the large influx of women—they 
accounted for over 60 percent of program participants in the beginning, and nearly 75 
percent in 2005 (Tcherneva and Wray 2005).  The hourly wage was set low enough for 
self-selection of indigent groups and also not to discourage beneficiaries from seeking 
more permanent (better paying) jobs. The design and implementation of Jefes was built 
on the success of Trabajar. From 1997 to 2002 and across all of Argentina’s 23 
provinces, Trabajar had provided wages to beneficiaries in return for their work on small 
infrastructure projects proposed by local governments and nongovernmental 
organizations. Similarly, the Labour Emergency Programme (PEL), initiated in 2001, 
provided temporary employment and vocational training to the unemployed, through 
projects that either created employment or affected employment creation (Devereux and 
Solomon 2006). 
   Of particular importance, it contains a subprogram for community development, 
which aims at creating productive employment for vulnerable women, especially heads of 
households. Activities specifically include those that are not traditionally performed by   36
women, such as bricklaying, building, and carpentry. Expenditure on Jefes reached 1 
percent of GDP in 2002 (Marshall 2004). The early experience of the Jefes program 
shows that a large program can be implemented quickly without major problems.  
It is also important to note that program participants receive additional benefits. 
Many Jefes projects provide free childcare for participants (with the care provided by 
Jefes workers)—this is significant, given that many participants are mothers with young 
children. Projects also provide literacy programs for adults, tutoring for children, 
counseling for families with drug abuse or domestic violence problems, and family 
planning. In interviews, many of the women working in the program emphasize that close 
proximity of their job to home is critical. Many of them had never been able to work 
outside the home, even before the economic crisis, because long commutes would take 
them too far away from their children. Jefes jobs in their neighborhood allowed them to 
check on their families throughout the day. 
Currently, the program is being scaled back. On February 14, 2006, President 
Néstor Kirchner announced that the Jefes program would be “redesigned” and partially 
replaced by two separate programs: (1) unemployment insurance (cash transfer), which 
will pay 225 pesos monthly, for a maximum of two years. The program will focus on 
training and job search and is designed for the “economically active.” The Labour 
Ministry expects 500,000 participants and (2) Plan Familias, a cash-transfer welfare 
program for poor families. It will pay a monthly benefit on a scale from 150 pesos for a 
family with one child, up to 275 pesos for a family of six children.  
 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh boasts one of the most cost effective job creation programs at one dollar 
(US$ 1) per job (Devereux and Solomon 2006:6). While the long-standing Food-For-
Work (FFW) program is the main employment creation program in Bangladesh, the 
Rural Maintenance Program (RMP) offers new direction for cash-based, long-term 
employment (four-year contracts). The RMP is a relatively small cash-based project run 
jointly by CARE Bangladesh and the Local Government Engineering Department 
(LGED), from which poor women are given year-round work, such as the maintenance of 
rural earthen roads (with an average of 60,000 destitute women per year being supported   37
by the program). The project employs different forms of community participation in the 
choice of beneficiaries, lowering Type I and II errors (Mujeri 2002: 35; Devereux and 
Solomon 2006:11). Programs under the LGED are largely two-fold: employment in 
construction activities (the bulk of employment is created for unskilled and semi-skilled 
labor, both male and female, who are usually poor); and employment in maintenance and 
tree plantation (more stable employment is generated for groups of destitute women) 
(Mujeri 2002: 42; Devereux and Solomon 2006: 21, 31). Furthermore there is a training 
component of the LGED, which covers social awareness, technical and job-related skill 
development and management. In addition, when women are employed to do 
maintenance and tree plantation, they are given training and social development inputs on 
income generation.  
 
Sri Lanka  
Through its National Housing Development Authority (NHDA), the government adopted 
an urban housing policy to initiate housing programs and build amenities like wells in 
low-income settlements. Community Development Councils (CDCs) were given say on 
the design, placement, and contractor choice for projects (including choosing themselves 
as the builders); thus, programs created a cost-effective way of providing basic services 
and infrastructure in low-income areas and involving communities in improving their 
environment. Between 1985 and 1999, the NHDA issued more than 400 community 
contracts for infrastructure and housing works, including the construction of drains, 
toilets, sewerage systems and roads. Communities provide counterpart funding in the 
form of labor, cash, or materials. Women in the community took a leading role in 
motivating people, collecting household contributions and daily supervision of the 
construction work. They also organized community meetings (Jayaratne 2003; Devereux 
and Solomon 2006: 12). 
 
Nepal  
The Dhaulagiri Irrigation Development Project (DIDP) in Nepal in 1989 was aimed at 
securing reliable irrigation water to small-scale mountain farmers, in order to increase 
food production and contribute to poverty alleviation. Food production in most sub-
projects implemented, increased by 20-30 percent post-project (Lokollo 1999). In order   38
to sustain the new irrigation infrastructure, popular participation involved farmers in 
construction/rehabilitation of irrigation schemes and used the network as a means to 
develop institutional, financial, and administrative units. Farmers and committee 
members have also received relevant training to develop and improve local skills 
(Devereux and Solomon 2006: 11). 
 
Cambodia 
“The employment potential for labor-based techniques [in Cambodia] is very high. … 
[with rural road creation involving] 5,000 unskilled workdays per km as opposed to 200 
workdays on an equipment-based operation. … It is estimated that using labor-based 
methods to carry out a program of rural road upgrading, combined with labor-based 
maintenance of the existing maintainable road network could generate between 3.7 and 
6.7 million days of work per year… Taking the maximum figure, this is equivalent to 
33,000 full time jobs, and would create opportunities for 100 rehabilitation contracts and 
270 maintenance contracts per year.” (Munters 2003: 7, 45, 48; Devereux and Solomon 
2006: 27). For such programs in Cambodia, the average cost of construction of one 
kilometre of road is US$ 15,000, with the lowest cost recorded in the labor-based work 
carried out by contract under the Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project (US$ 11,116 
per km), while the highest costs were recorded by the equipment-based contracts of the 
Urban Restoration Project of the Department of Public Works and Transport (US$ 20,678 
per km) (Munters 2003: 45). Nevertheless, only 37 percent of total costs of labor-based 
rural road works went on wages for unskilled labor and 11 percent was paid to skilled 
labor (Munters 2003: 43). 
 
Indonesia  
Following the financial crisis, the government’s official 1998/99 Social Safety Net 
program created a series of emergency job creation measures, collectively known as 
Padat Karya. The programs were a revival of earlier effort by the same name to build 
infrastructure (village roads, schools and irrigation channels) throughout rural Indonesia 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The Social Safety Net was not one single job creation 
program, but a variety of projects with the commonality that they theoretically drew on 
labor-intensive methods to undertake small-scale village-based infrastructure or public   39
works projects. Since its re-launch in 1998, Padat Karya has expanded to comprise 13 
sub-programs, involving eight executing agencies and reaching more than 300 districts. 
Padat Karya programs had low participation rates for women (19 percent) compared with 
men (81 percent) (Sumarto et al. 2001), largely a result of the heavy physical labor 
required on most projects, and because the program was targeted at household heads 
(which, in the Indonesian context excluded most women by definition). The program has 
been criticized for its lack of “adequate attention to the need for a disaggregated database 
and supporting community-level structures to ensure proper targeting and sustainability,” 
(Islam et al. 2001: 64-65; Devereux and Solomon 2006:14).  In response to such 
criticisms, several new initiatives have been developed, including new employment 
programs that emphasize empowerment and use community-based approaches to 
generate employment and incomes. 
 
Korea 
During the East Asian meltdown of 1997-1998, Korea moved from a nation essentially 
without a social safety net (due to near full employment pre-crisis) to a “Master Plan for 
Tackling Unemployment,” (Kwon 2002a: 5). Under this initiative, the Employment 
Insurance Programme was extended; emergency public works programs were 
implemented to create jobs for unemployed workers who would otherwise not have any 
social protection; a new income support program for the poor, the Minimum Living 
Standard Guarantee (MLSG), was introduced; and the health care system was reformed 
over 1998-2000 (Atinc 2000, Kwon 2002b: 1-2, 9-10). For the public works, there were 
four categories of work: infrastructure-maintaining projects including cultivating forest, 
building small public facilities and repairing public utilities; provisions for a workforce 
for social service and charity organizations such as community centers and welfare 
institutions; environment-cleaning work, which includes roadside cleaning and rubbish 
collection; and information-technology related projects, which are targeted at the young, 
and computer-literate people (Lee 2000: 7). The whole package of programs under the 
“Master Plan for Tackling Unemployment” accounted for ten percent of Korean 
government expenditure, with PWPs claiming 1.62 percent at their height (Kwon 2002b: 
11).    40
Brazil 
In Brazil, programs of direct employment creation have not been implemented at the 
national level; although, a number of emergency programs to create jobs for the urban 
poor were planned at the federal level in 1997 and 1999, after the devaluation, but never 
implemented. There are several state and municipal programs, namely Sao Paulo, all of 
which are small-scale and have minor labor market impacts (Marshall  2004: 30). Instead 
of ELR programs, Brazilian labor market-interventions focus on subsidizing the cost to 
employers to take on new employees (especially those prone to poverty). Such efforts 
began in late 2003 when the “First Employment” (Primeiro Emprego, PPE) program was 
launched, which aims to secure jobs for 16-24 year old workers without previous work 
experience, no secondary degree and who come from families with a per capita income of 
up to one half minimum wage—a group representing 44% of the unemployed. The aim is 
to assist 250,000 young workers in a given year (Marshall 2004: 31). 
 
Bolivia 
Established in 1986, the Emergency Social Fund (ESF), was a demand-based approach 
aimed at the creation of large infrastructure through PWPs. The programs failed to reach 
the groups most affected by trends in liberalization and privatization, namely specific 
industry workers; furthermore, the participation of the poorest two deciles was 
disproportionately low. The programs did, however, benefit over 1 million poor during its 
4 years, administering $240 million. Despite such impressive figures, the focus on heavy-
construction resulted in an extremely poor female participation rate (<1%) (Graham 
1996, 3). The programs were also costly by comparative standards, with the cost of 
creating one job eight times that of Bangladesh (Devereux and Solomon 2006: 6). The 
project did, however, surpass partisan politics and helped bolster NGOs’ and localities’ 
ability to administer funds independent of central authority. The broad base of support 
also prevented any one group from taking credit. 
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Chile 
Unlike many countries that liberalized, Chile had an extensive social welfare system prior 
to adjustment. Large-scale PWPs were introduced between 1975-1987 to combat severe 
unemployment (30% at its height in 1982), and employed up to 13 percent of the 
workforce. Wages for PWP workers were ½ to ¼ of the minimum wage to ensure self-
targeting (Graham 1996: 6-7). There was a sharp difference in the participation rates of 
the two major initiatives, with 75 percent of the Minimum Employment Program (PEM) 
comprised of women versus only 30 percent in the higher paying Program for Heads of 
Households (POJH). Such stark contrast led to discrimination of PEM workers as inferior 
and unproductive. Later, the Fund for Solidarity and Social Investment (FOSIS) 
incorporated beneficiary participation and brought women into a productive focus over a 
solely reproductive role (Graham 1996: 7). In Chile and Peru, most workfare programs 
were closed in the late 1980s due to a combination of poor design, stigmatized 
participants, and political manipulation (Márquez 1999: 10; Devereux and Solomon 
2006: 8, 19-20).  
 
Peru 
The Programa de Apoyo al Ingreso Temporal (PAIT) was a PWP modelled on Chile’s 
experience. The program employed 500,000 for 3-months in Lima’s shantytowns, but 
was top-down and plagued by clientelism and political manipulation of workers (Graham 
1996: 8-9). While the program targeted women foremost, it often delegated them to 
inferior roles that men would not tolerate. Fondo Nacional de Cooperacion para el 
Desarrollo Social (FONCODES), a 1991 social fund similar to ESF, has incorporated 
greater elements of success (international backing, a clear priority and private sector 
directions), but is still marred by special interests. Despite being politicized, FONCODES 
funded almost 16,000 community-based projects, for a total budget of about 465 million 
soles  (roughly US$285 million) between December 1991 and May 1995. The average 
project size was quite small (about US$18,000) and focused on community-based 
endeavors aimed at nutrition, family planning, rotating credit schemes, and projects for 
the construction or rehabilitation of schools, health posts, water and sanitation systems,   42
rural roads, electrification schemes, and small-scale irrigation works. In 1993, 
FONCODES expenditures accounted for roughly 0.55% of GNP. 
 
El Salvador 
The Fund for Social Investment (FIS) was launched in 1989 with $33 million from the 
IDB and $6 million of the El Salvadorian government’s funds; subsequently, the program 
has attracted $12 million from other donors and $15.88 million in counterpart funds from 
beneficiaries and soliciting agencies. Like the ESF, administration costs have been kept 
to 5% of total spending. The program gives primary focus to mothers and then women in 
general, with priority also going to impoverished areas involved in the civil war, then to 
poor areas in general, and finally to sites of conflict. From its inception until September 
1992, the program had administered $30.6 million to 1,432,926 persons, a very 
impressive record in a country of just over 5 million. The FIS works closely with NGOs 




The proposed National Solidarity Program (Pronasol) was a large-scale version of the 
Bolivia’s demand-based social fund, earmarking $240 million over four years, that never 
realized its projected potential. The program was intended to work with locally elected 
Solidarity committees (of which there are 64,000 nationwide) and would have blended 
many development strategies (food support, social services, infrastructure, micro-credit 
and a women only fund aimed at supporting small industries (Graham 1996). Programa 
de Empleo Temporal (PET), a 1995 effort following the economic crisis, aimed to 
develop communities through labor-intensive projects. By 2000, PET was addressed to 
marginal rural areas, and improving social and productive infrastructure. PET’s budget 
also earmarked 20% of its funds for natural disasters relief efforts atop of normal PET 
activities. Starting with 660,000 beneficiaries in 1995, the program had increased to one 
million participants by 2000 (Marshall 2004: 30-31). 
 
 
   43
Botswana  
Like other middle-income countries (Argentina and South Africa), Botswana’s 
employment programs are usually financed entirely out of domestic fiscal resources 
(Devereux and Solomon, 2006: 5). Following the 1980s droughts, 23 percent of 
Botswana’s workforce was employed in the “Labour-Based Relief Programme,” which in 
1986, translated to three million days of paid employment for 74,000 workers, out of a 
total workforce of 320,000 (Devereux and Solomon 2006: 26). During the 1990s, the 
wage rate in the Labour-Intensive Rural Public Works Programme was fixed by the 
government at 70 percent of the minimum wage for unskilled formal sector workers. 
Since this wage was applied uniformly across the country, it had different implications 
for self-targeting in different areas, resulting in a rationing of jobs and the inclusion of the 
less impoverished. Despite inclusion errors, the high rate of female participation (60-70 
percent of total employment) is an indicator of overall effective poverty targeting 
(Tesfaye 1995; Devereux and Solomon 2006: 9). Furthermore, certain gender sensitivities 
can be observed in the program design that are absent in many other nations, such as time 
for breastfeeding without pay-cut implications and the promotion of women to 
supervisory roles (Dejardin 1996; Devereux and Solomon 2006: 32-33). The duration of 
employment was a major shortcoming, however, where “the temporary nature of income 
did not translate into appreciable investment at the household level” (Tesfaye 1995: 151).  
 
Senegal  
In 1987, DIRE compensated civil servants who had voluntarily retired and would-be 
government employees with up to US$50,000 for business start-ups. The lack of follow-
ups, support, and training made for poor success rates. Funding was administered by the 
Public Treasury, which subsequently “lost” $3 million. The funds were targeted mostly at 
privileged men and marked by clientelism. Civil unrest in 1988 led to the creation of 
Agetip (influenced by Bolivia’s ESF). The program focused on labor-intensive 
infrastructure projects (no social aspects) and was administered by an independent 
agency with a private sector director. From the beginning of 1990 to the end of 1991, the 
program created 11,000 temporary jobs with spillover to the private sector (Graham 
1996: 4). The program lacked cooperation mechanisms with NGOs and did not have   44
poverty criteria, resulting in limited impacts on the lives of women and the very poor 
(Graham 1996: 5).  
 
Morocco 
Created in 1961, Promotion Nationale (PN) is an autonomous public entity in charge of 
mobilizing under-employed or unemployed labour force for the implementation of labour 
intensive projects, calling upon a simple technology likely to provide employment to 
unskilled workers. It is one of the major programs of social protection in the country, the 
oldest, most important and best targeted social program in Morocco. This institution aims 
at limiting rural migration through a permanent improvement of local income and living 
conditions. It thus constitutes a safety net for a large part of the population particularly in 
rural areas. PN mobilizes labour of the poor rural populations, in order to address 
unemployment and attenuate rural migration ; direct its intervention in the rural zones to 
the construction of water supply channels and cisterns, the digging of wells and the 
construction of rural roads and reforestation ; contributes to cleaning, maintenance of 
parks and improvement of the quality of life and environment in the urban areas as well 
as support sector projects carried out within the framework of the social development 
strategy. The Moroccan experience in the public works of unemployed through the PN is 
remarkable. Indeed, 45 years after its creation, PN has at its credit an important and 
single assessment regarding the fight against unemployment with small management 
costs. On average the operating costs represent only 6% of investments costs, which is 
definitely lower than the average costs of the public administration and lower in 
comparison of other countries where it is around 10%. In spite of certain difficulties and 
limitations which particularly hinder the action of the organization regarding the 
geographical targeting of rural poor zones, PN programs remains one of the most 
efficient mechanisms of social protection of the country.  It is also a buffer stock in 
period of economic crisis or severe drought.  In other to contribute effectively to the fight 
against unemployment according to the employer of last resort model, PN has to offer 
more jobs for all those willing to work ; to remove constraints which weak the turnover 
of the beneficiaries in urban areas and fight against the acquired advantages, to encourage 
the Local Communities to deal with the staff costs which weigh the PN budget down and   45
to reallocate the communities program budget to the equipment of the rural areas, as well 
as to pursue the reduction of the credits allocated to the urban areas and to increase 
allocations to the rural locations in order to improve the targeting of the poor populations 
and to modernize the information system by disaggregating by sex data related to 
beneficiaries. (Hind Jalal, personal communication, mimeo) 
 
Zambia  
1980 witnessed a lower per capita GDP in Zambia than the 1960s, allowing a pro-reform 
government, in 1991, to implement free-market strategies and make reaching 
marginalized groups a priority. The Micro-Project Unit (MPU) targeted the poor and 
followed an ESF focus on renovating existing infrastructure (Graham 1996: 6). Labor on 
infrastructure projects such as road maintenance or dam construction was categorized by 
task as “light,”  “moderate,” or “heavy” and women and men worked together in gangs, 
with men taking on the heavier tasks (e.g. breaking stones and compacting the road 
surface) and women taking the lighter tasks (e.g. head-loading baskets of stones from the 
quarry to the roadside). Despite the task division, women were still forced to 
“subcontract” men for some of the tasks, in exchange for half their cash-for-work income 
(Devereux and Solomon 2006: 31). A wage rate set higher than the national or local 
minimum wage, caused the number of jobs offered on the program to be rationed 
(Devereux and Solomon 2006: 8). The Zambian government also instituted a Food for 
Work scheme, which paid workers in food for labor on social infrastructure (building pit 
latrines was cited as a project). 90 percent of these workers were women, reflecting a 
social stigma in men working for payment other than cash and the fact that only the 
poorest segments of society will work for food.  
 
Ghana  
Similarly to Zambia, Ghana saw its real per capita income fall 30% from 1970 and 1982; 
for 1975 to 1983, real minimum wage fell by 86%. By some measures 35.93% of Ghana 
was poor in 1988. The Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment 
(PAMSCAD) began in 1988 with $85 million in international donations. The program 
was designed to specifically target women and other vulnerable groups, but caved to 
pressures from donors and vocal urban lobbying. The program blended labor-intensive   46
infrastructure generation with micro-credit endeavors. There was also a food-for-work 
program in the north during the dry season. Certain success can be claimed, such as small 
contractors training to rehabilitate and maintain feeder roads, which resulted in three 
times (320 percent) more employment creation than capital-intensive methods. These 
positive results are mainly achieved where there was careful site selection, close 




In western Uganda, local communities work together with government officials to 
identify problems on rural public works programs, making amendments to improve their 
design or to better address local needs. This positive interaction between program 
implementers and beneficiaries promotes a perception that the government is both 
responsive and accountable to local residents. By means of “impact workshops,” 
communities identify who benefits from the improved roads. Women’s representation 
and participation are, however, still limited in decision-making and project selection, 
especially for infrastructure projects (ASIST Bulletin No.10, 2000; Devereux and 
Solomon 2006: 12). 
 
Malawi  
In the late 1990s, two employment-based safety net programs were running alongside one 
another (often simultaneously in the same villages)–a food-for-work program 
implemented by WFP and a cash-for-work project implemented by the Malawi Social 
Action Fund (MASAF) (Devereux and Solomon 2006). The participation of women in 
the food program was over-representative (in line with similar programs elsewhere) 
(Devereux 1999). In MASAF programs, women’s participation varied greatly, with road 
rehabilitation contracts offering 42 percent participation (which exceeded the gender 
target of 40 percent), but bridge work contracts only offering 27 percent to women 
(Lwanda and Esterhuizen 2005; Devereux and Solomon 2006: 32). The “Rural Access 
and Mobility Pilot Activity” (RAMPA), which is being implemented within the 
framework of the Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Programme in Malawi, has 
encountered planning problems. “Access profiles” prepared to enable prioritization of   47
interventions and integration into District Development Plans (DDPs) have amounted to 
little more than shopping lists that were produced on the basis of secondary data. As a 
result, the level of community participation in the process was inadequate, which made 
the implementation of identified projects difficult since most of the pre-set priorities had 




Tanzania’s Special Labour-Intensive Public Works Programme was jointly implemented 
by the Government of Tanzania, UNDP, and the ILO, but was co-funded by Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and the European Union (Tesfaye 1995: 159; Devereux and 
Solomon 2006: 5). The high wage rate resulted in the number of jobs offered being 
rationed (Devereux and Solomon 2006:8). Also, program timing coincided with the 
agricultural season, resulting in relatively low stabilization effects on incomes (Subbarao 
1997: 6; Devereux and Solomon 2006:16). Nonetheless, there are successful programs, 
such as the Rehabilitation and Maintenance of District and Feeder Roads project in 
Mwanza, which rehabilitates and maintains a network of nearly 200 km of roads. Some 
stretches linking fishing villages to vital arteries of the road network have already seen a 
three-fold increase in traffic in 2000 (Melgaard 2000; Devereux and Solomon 2006:11). 
 
Zimbabwe  
The Rural Transport Study (RTS) sought to improve access to transport in two districts. 
A number of access interventions were selected by a consistent process of community 
participation, especially that of women, since they bore most of the transport and travel 
responsibilities. Footbridges, footpaths, and borehole construction were among the 
interventions implemented. These interventions clearly had direct positive implications 
for women, in terms of enhancing their access and reducing their travel time to fetch 
water. Women have greatly benefited from the boreholes and footpaths, because they do 
95 percent of water collection by head-loading (Lema 2003; Devereux and Solomon, 
2006:36).  
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Australia  
Post-war Australia was characterized by a commitment to full-employment through 
Keynesian policies, fiscal spending aimed at stimulating aggregate demand and a strong 
public sector presence in the labor market (Quirk et al. 2006). Neoliberal policies took 
over in the mid-1970s and, despite a brief flirtation with employment-centred social 
policy under the Hawke Labour government in the mid-1980s, private sector agents guide 
employment. The government has replaced the Keynesian Commonwealth Employment 
Service (CES) with a scattering of programs such as “Work for the Dole” and private-
oriented Centrelink and the Job Network, which have poor track records (Productivity 
Commission 2002: Chapter 10; Cowling and Mitchell 2002: 12-14). Perhaps not 
coincidentally, unemployment hovered near 9 percent in the 1990 and remains near 5 
percent today. This is a sharp contrast to averaging near 2 percent from the mid-1940s to 
the mid-1970s. Furthermore, in 1973, the public employment share was around 3 percent 
higher than was in 2002 or roughly 500,000 jobs smaller in relative terms (Cowling and 
Mitchell 2002: 16). 
 
France  
In December 2005, France launched an ELR in six districts, to be evaluated in the first 
quarter of 2007 before being officially adopted nationwide. Workers laid off from 
companies of less than 300 employees will be eligible for a “Professional Transition 
Contact” (contrat de transition professionnelle: CTP), guaranteeing them employment 
also providing “individualized coaching” and follow up for the passive unemployment 
category. The total cost of the program is estimated at 70 billion euros or 4% of GDP (3% 
activity income, .4% training programs, and .6% individualized follow up) if all the 
unemployed were to enter the program immediately. This would be a less expensive 
program than the current 4.2% of GDP spent on unemployment compensations and other 
employment programs (Kaboub 2007). 
 